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Main conclusions
• The debate whether the united Europe should be a federation or a
Europe of nations is mostly of a historical significance because, within
the European Union, there is already a division into states fully co-
operating with each other and the less integrated ones. These states
form integration rings.
• Thanks to the change in the pace of the integration process and the
Union’s natural breakdown into rings, Poland may join the EU without
having to wait to satisfy all the criteria required to become a member of
its core nucleus. Without the Union’s breakdown into rings and the
diversification of the pace of integration, Poland’s accession to the EU,
just like the accession of other Central Eastern European countries,
would probably become entirely impossible due to major economic
differences.
• During previous enlargement waves of the European Union, the
responsibility for the negotiations was, in fact, vested in the European
Commission. After the collapse of the bipolar division of Europe, and in
the absence of the need to consolidate the security of the EU against
former threats posed by the communist bloc, there has been a natural
trend to shift the centre of gravity of the negotiations from the European
Commission to the Council of the European Union and individual
member states. The change is very disadvantageous for the candidate
countries. Internal conflicts will be slowing down the negotiation
process, or will lead to far-reaching compromises disadvantageous for
the candidate countries. It is very likely that, during the negotiations, a
global way of thinking about the future of Europe and a long-term
concept of its development, will be replaced by particular and often
contradictory interests of the member states.
• There are three possible scenarios reflecting the prospective course of
developments. According to the first scenario, the enlargement to
include Central Eastern European countries will be preceded by the
inter-government conference held in order to reform the Union’s
2institutions. That scenario is particularly disadvantageous for the
candidate countries because the new EU architecture would be
negotiated and established without their involvement. On the other
hand, a positive impact of the Union’s reform being undertaken already
now, would be elimination of the problem that during the first
enlargement wave, the Union would admit only five new members,
which would imply the need to shift one of the six countries currently
holding accession talks to the next round of negotiations.
• According to the second scenario, Poland would join the EU even
before the inter-government conference meant to reform the Union’s
institutional system. This would imply that one of the countries currently
negotiating their membership of the EU would be eliminated. In that
case, the size of Poland and its population should be regarded as an
advantage. Being a large country, Poland would undermine the current
overly large representation of small and medium sized countries in the
Union.
• According to the third scenario, Poland would not join the EU after the
current accession negotiations. The costs inflicted by Poland being
transferred to the group of countries waiting for the next enlargement
wave would be very high. A decision to exclude Poland from the first
enlargement wave would destabilise the situation of the entire continent
in a longer run. By remaining outside the Union, Poland would move
back to the buffer zone. By being left on its own, the country would find
itself in a European grey zone which would be difficult to define.
Western capital would flow out of the country, and would be replaced
by the capital of eastern and western criminal organisations. The Odra
River would become a trafficking route for illegal immigrants, drugs,
and money laundering. Once left on its own, Poland would become a
base for various kinds of criminal organisations. As a consequence, the
Union would have to exclude the country from the Schengen
Agreement, tighten controls on its external borders, and restore visas.
Thus, the Union would fall into a self-propelling syndrome of a
stronghold under siege both in the south and in the east.
3European integration rings
Discussions about Poland’s integration with the EU often ignore the
fact that the united Europe based on the foundations laid out by the Treaty
of Rome is becoming history. At the time of Poland’s accession, the
European Union will be an entirely different organisation from what it is
now. Its institutional structure will probably be different, and so will be the
decision making procedures and the rate of growth. The depth of the
political, economic and social changes in the EU will impact on the
process of negotiations with Poland. Already now, the Union sometimes
begins to appear like a moving target. The experience of other countries
from which Poland is drawing during the negotiations is mainly of a
historical character. Those countries were joining Europe in which the
most contentious issue concerned the political system, i.e., whether the
united Europe should be a federation or a Europe of nations. The member
states were divided over the issue for fifty years. It had a great impact on
the decisions made by the Union and on the Union’s entire institutional
and legal system. However, the issue so vital to the countries participating
in the West European integration process, is of a secondary importance to
Poland whose involvement in the dispute is of a purely intellectual
character. As of yet, there are no signs indicating that at the time of its
accession to the EU, Poland would have a realistic possibility to join the
Union’s core nucleus, i.e., the group of countries actually supporting a
federate character of mutual relations.
The history of real integration within Western Europe started on the
day when the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
was signed. The positive experience of that Community encouraged further
integration efforts. At the same time, the Communities were enlarged to
include new countries. In 1973, Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined the
Community, eight years later Greece, Spain and Portugal in 1986, and
Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995. For nearly fifty years the
advancement of integration in Western Europe was based on the strong
foundation laid by the Berlin Wall. The vast majority of ideas concerning
the future of the integration process and the directions of its development
ended at the foot of the Wall. Those ideas were buried by the same
hammers that tore down the Wall. European integration had to change its
so-far direction. It took time for European politicians to realise that.1
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 In 1991, Poland had to put a lot of effort to force through in the preamble to the Europe Agreement a
unilateral declaration that its goal was the membership of the Communities. However, for example,
Greece had no problems with such declaration. The association agreement between the Communities
and Greece included a promise of full membership.
4In 1991-1992 a broad discussion was going on in Brussels about the
deepening of the Community. It basically denied the possibility of
simultaneous enlargement and deepening, which were regarded as
conflicting processes. The crisis related to the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty, the economic recession, and the public’s growing disappointment
with the idea of deepening integration provoked a kind of a leap forward.
Even before the ratification process of the Treaty was concluded,
enlargement negotiations began with Austria and the Scandinavian
countries. The deepening gave way to the enlargement. The enlargement
was meant to demonstrate to the people of the member states the
invariably strong attractiveness of the Union. The institutional reform of
the Union was postponed until the next inter-government conference, i.e.,
until 1996. As we already know, the Amsterdam Treaty turned out to be a
failure in that sense, and under Art. 2, Section IV of the Amsterdam
Treaty, a thorough institution reform of the Union is to take place before
the admission of the twenty-first state into the Communities.
The Maastricht Treaty revealed a serious diversification of interests
among the member states. Despite the ideas which guided the main
authors of the concept, the Treaty stimulated the opponents of deeper
integration to join forces. The Treaty will go down in history not so
much in connection with the establishment of the European Union, but
most of all, because its conclusion ended the building of a united
Europe on the basis of consensus among all the member states. For the
first time a varied pace of integration was allowed for individual member
states. Also for the first time, a legal provision was made for derogation
enabling a member state or a group of member states not to participate in
an initiative undertaken by the Union.
In the legal sense, the Maastricht Treaty created a mechanism
to exclude particular member states from co-operation in specific
areas within the Union. On these basis, the Council of the European
Union decided about allowing particular member states to join the
monetary union. The member states were automatically divided into those
which fully co-operated with each other, and the weaker integrated ones. It
is now possible to identify two rings of integration. The core nucleus of the
Union emerged, thereby forming the first ring. It is comprised of the eleven
member states participating in the monetary union, i.e.: France, Germany,
Austria, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Finland, and the Benelux countries.
The second ring includes the member states which did not join the
monetary union. These are: Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and Greece.
5Poland, together with other countries aspiring to the EU membership, will
form the third integration ring.2
The core nucleus of the Union is, in fact, comprised of the countries
which chose the federate character of integration. The states forming the
outer rings rather cherish the idea of a Europe of nations, i.e., a
confederate character of the European Union.
The emergence of European integration rings and the diversification
of the pace of the process pursued by particular states market a new
political trend. That trend was considered highly controversial both by the
candidate countries and for the Union. It may seem to offer numerous
advantages. A varied pace of integration for particular countries enables
their faster or slower accession to the groups of countries comprised in
particular rings without a risk of undermining the Union’s integration
achievements to date. The formal acceptance of the varied integration pace
mollifies and to a large extent eliminates the risk of slowing down the
integration processes within the core nucleus of the Union. On the other
hand, the very existence of that open and non-confined nucleus becomes a
challenge and a stimulus encouraging integration processes in the countries
wishing to join it. Thanks to the diversification of the pace of
integration, and the breakdown of the Union into integration rings,
Poland can achieve the EU membership without a need to satisfy all
the conditions that would enable the country to join the Union’s core
nucleus. Otherwise, the achievement of the EU membership by
Poland as well as other Central Eastern European countries would
probably be entirely impossible due to considerable economic
differences. The membership in the Union will enable those countries
to take advantage of financial assistance provided by the EU, thereby
making it possible for them to make up those differences much faster.
From the point of view of the candidate countries, the strategy of
diversified integration pace is a tempting arrangement, especially in the
short run. However, one may have doubts when looking at it from the
long-term perspective. The strategy compels the member states to go back
to their roots, to the idea of solidarity and the prevalence of the common
goal. The countries placed in the outer rings must enjoy equal rights and
equal opportunities in terms of joining the core nucleus and eliminating
differences. Only this way can Europe integrate into a homogenous entity.
The direction must be clearly determined. It is necessary to define new
goals. The so-far goals for which the Communities were established, have
already been achieved. Germany has been reconciled with its neighbours,
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 Cf. Popowicz K., Strategiczne cele mandatu negocjacyjnego Polski z UE [Strategic Goals of the
Polish Mandate for Negotiations with the EU], the Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 1998.
6the economy has been rebuilt, and the expansion of the Soviet Union has
been stopped. The new goals of integration seeking to build Europe’s
economic power, consolidate democracy, and, in a broader sense, build a
civic European state, have not been clearly defined yet. The French-
German axis which has constituted the driving force of integration process
to date is no longer effective. The long-term political ties between
countries, which have existed to date, are increasingly often replaced by
temporary alliances aimed at achieving specific goals. “(...) Despair has
emerged that may ruin further integration of Europe. That despair has
taken various forms in particular countries, but it has provoked fear and a
lack of determination among the political circles in most countries at a
time that calls for imagination and courage. The sense of family ties among
the heads of state and government has been disappearing, and certain
issues increasingly fall hostage on behalf of obtaining progress in other
matters important to the national interests [retranslated].”3
None of the EU summits to date has come up with a coherent
concept of a united Europe at a level of the continent. One may get the
impression that the Union has lost its sense of direction. It is hesitating
which path it should follow. The ongoing processes result from the
sequence of events rather than a conscious strategy. The establishment
of rings with varied levels of integration within the Union is potentially
dangerous. The Union has now found itself at a cross-roads. No concept
has been worked out concerning its future. Thus, it is not certain under
what conditions the EU rings will be functioning in the future, and after all,
the rings have a large destructive potential. The approval of a varied pace
of integration among the member states implies consent to a kind of
internal disintegration. That disintegration does not have to prove
dangerous in a Europe that upholds solidarity, in which a free movement
of member states from the outer rings to the core nucleus is not blocked.
However, there is no guarantee that Europe will remain to be that way.
Despite all the conditions, the existence of the closer co-operation
mechanism (coopération plus étroite) will enable a unification of individual
states into groups of interest.4 There may be situations when a group of
countries will seek to prevent the participation of other countries in
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 Under the Amsterdam Treaty, the establishment of the closer co-operation mechanism should be
aimed to enable a more efficient implementation of the Union’s tasks, while fully respecting the
treaties and the uniform institutional framework of the Communities. Such co-operation is to
constitute the final resort and a decision to apply the mechanism requires a majority of the member
states to participate in a given initiative. The costs related to that co-operation, with the exception of
administrative costs, are to be covered by the participating states. At the same time, that co-operation
must not undermine the competence, powers, duties, or interests of other member states that are not
involved in a given initiative which must be open to all member states.
7particular activity. A pursuit of particular interests of individual EU rings
at the level of the Council of the European Union may block the
aspirations of countries from the outer rings. As it is known, the decision
to exclude Greece from the monetary union was made under the authority
of the Council. By the power of Art. 109k of the European Communities
Treaty, Greece became a member state with a derogation, and was unable
to do anything about that. The reasons underlying its exclusion from the
monetary union were of a purely economic character. However, the point
is that the future of the Union is unknown, and there is no guarantee that
decisions to exclude a state or a group of states from particular activity
will be made exclusively on substantial grounds, and not with the aim of
defending the interests of another group of states. Let us imagine the
following hypothetical situation: around the year 2015, France, Germany
and the Benelux countries seek to take advantage of the coopération plus
étroite mechanism in order to establish the foundations of the common
defence policy (a unanimous decision would no longer be required
regarding that matter). Ukraine, being a member state, declares its
willingness to participate in the initiative, but it is involved in a strong
conflict with Russia, similarly to the conflict between Greece and Turkey.
On the other hand, Russia is under a dictatorship regime. The conflict is
growing increasingly acute. Is there anyone in Europe now who could
swear that, in such a hypothetical situation, the Council would not look for
an excuse to exclude Ukraine from the common defence policy of the inner
circle of countries?5
A division of the Union into various integration rings poses a threat
to its coherence, and as a consequence, may lead to its disintegration. In
the context of its historical experience, Poland is more aware of that threat
compared to other countries. The Polish-Lithuanian union state kept a
clearly federate character for four centuries. Historians claim that one of
the main reasons underlying its decline in the early 17th century was a firm
resistance by the Polish and Lithuanian elites against granting Ukraine an
equal status with that enjoyed by Poland and Lithuania. The rejection of
the proposal to transform the union of two nations into a union of three
nations and repression against Ukrainians led to a series of Ukrainian
national insurgencies. The insurgencies were bloody civil wars which not
only withered the state, but also started internal anarchy that lasted one
and a half century, weakened the sense of state interests and raison d’état,
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 It is also necessary to take into account irrational factors, limited trust, or hidden animosities felt
towards some of the new member states which, for example, may be considered not to belong to the
Western civilisation. (Huntington warns, for instance, that in the case of countries such as Rumania or
Bulgaria, their integration with Europe may be very difficult.) Such prejudice may influence the
decisions made by the Council as well.
8thereby deteriorating the Polish foreign policy. The final consequence was
the collapse of the union state at the end of the 18th century. Bearing that
in mind, one must realise that we are not establishing the European Union
for several years or for several dozen years. When building it, we hope
that it will last centuries. The current consent to the creation of European
integration rings may in the future supply grounds for conflicts between the
Union’s members: between the better and the worse, the equal and more
equal ones. As history shows, that may crack the Union from inside, and
even lead to its disintegration and ultimate collapse. The union of Poland
and Lithuania lasted four centuries. It was the most successful attempt at
the establishment of a federate structure on the European continent until
the creation of the European Economic Community. At the same time, the
extent of internal integration of the Polish-Lithuanian Union was even
stronger compared to the European Union today. Nevertheless, the Polish-
Lithuanian state collapsed. The European Union should remember about
that when making the risky decision concerning rings with a varied degree
and strength of integration among the member states. On the other hand, if
Poland, as a member of the European Union, wants to promote its own
vision of Europe, it should lead to a broader debate among European
intellectuals, philosophers, historians and politicians about the history of
the former Polish-Lithuanian Union. After all, none of the modern West
European states has four centuries long historical experience of existing in
a broad federate structure.
9The fifth enlargement of the European Union
The Communities have been enlarged four times to date. The fifth
enlargement is to comprise East European countries. Until now, the
enlargement waves of the Communities were of an internal character
because they concerned western countries. The process was guided by a
clear political goal stemming from the bipolar division of Europe and the
world. The deepening of integration at the same time enhanced the security
of the member states, thereby reinforcing the dichotomy in the
development of Europe. The character of the European Union’s
enlargement to include Central Eastern European countries is of an entirely
different character. It has become possible as a result of the collapse of the
earlier political division of Europe.
In the case of earlier enlargement waves the gravity of the
negotiations in fact lied with the European Commission. However, the fall
of the dichotomy dividing Europe, and the lack of a need to consolidate
the Union’s security against the threats earlier posed by the communist
bloc have naturally shifted the weight of the negotiations from the
European Commission to the EU Council and particular member states.
That change of proportion between the involvement of the
Union as a whole and particular member states in the negotiations is
highly disadvantageous for the candidate countries. Internal conflicts
will be either slowing down the negotiation process, they will lead to
far reaching compromises disadvantageous for the candidate
countries. It is very likely that the global way of thinking about the
future of Europe and a long-term concept of its development will be
replaced during the negotiations by individual and often conflicting
interests of the member states.
During the current negotiations, it will be the Council, and not the
Commission, that will become the main arena for the conflicts of interests
which are bound to emerge because the enlargement of the European
Union to include Central Eastern European countries will disturb the
current unique balance among the member states. The position of the
northern countries will be reinforced, while the geographical centre of the
Union will be simultaneously shifted further into the interior of the
continent. Germany, being a country directly adjacent to the region, will be
the greatest beneficiary of the process. Germany, but also Austria and the
Scandinavian countries, will be the first ones to feel the economic and
political advantages brought about by the accession of new members. In
this context, it would be difficult to argue with analysts who project that,
during the next decade, Berlin will become the actual capital of Europe. It
is very likely that the southern countries, including France, will make some
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kind of claims or demand compensation for the enlargement. The cost of
that compensation certainly will not be paid by the northern countries, but
it will be finally incurred by the new members. The character of the costs
involved will be both political, e.g., a smaller number of votes on the
Council, and economic, e.g., a smaller share of the structural funds.
The Union’s economic development and the enhancement of its
competitiveness in the international market largely depend on the
enlargement. However, that does not translate directly into a possible
consensus among the member states concerning acceleration or facilitation
of the negotiations. On the contrary, the countries which are to join the
Union now have a much more difficult way to the accession compared to
their predecessors. None of the countries joining the Union in the past was
faced with predefined terms of accession. Thanks to earlier signed
association agreements, the countries aspiring to the EU membership
became involved in the EU free trade zone. The opening of Central
Eastern European markets to EU companies took place without major
financial assistance provided by the Union. Given the existing disparity of
economic potential, the asymmetry provided for in the association
agreements was unable to serve as a barrier preventing the occurrence of
serious trade deficits. “The countries which joined the Union earlier did
not abolish barriers in trade until the achievement of the membership, and
sometimes even after having negotiated longer transition periods. Thus,
they achieved the membership in exchange for concessions in trade policy,
and in addition, they derived benefits from that. Such a compromise is out
of the question in the context of the accession of new members from our
region. On the contrary, liberalisation of trade is taking place in a situation
when it is not connected with the membership status, and specifically, it is
a precondition of accession, but not an issue in negotiations that would
increase the bargaining power of the candidate countries.”6
The EU membership of Central Eastern European countries will be
a result of a compromise among the EU member states. It is difficult to
predict how far the compromise will go. On the other hand, one may quite
easily determine the areas which the compromise will concern.
The first scenario
The first option is based on the assumption that the fifth
enlargement will be preceded by the inter-government conference held to
reform the Union’s institutions. That option is very disadvantageous for
us, and for only one main reason. The new architecture of the Union
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would be negotiated and established without our participation. Even if the
Union keeps the appearances of holding consultations with the candidate
countries concerning the directions of proposed reforms, they will still
have no influence on the final shape of the reforms. Decisions concerning
us will be made without us. Unfortunately, we know such situations well
form history. We have absolutely no influence regarding the decision to
hold the conference. On the other hand, the positive result of the institution
reform being carried out already now will be a removal of the problem that
only five countries can join the Union during the first enlargement wave,
which otherwise, would imply the need to shift one of the six countries
currently holding accession talks to the next round of negotiations.
The most important matters to be settled include a change of the
current system of voting in the Council, reducing the number of
commissioners, maintaining the efficiency of the Commission, and
increasing the role of the European Parliament. This study is not intended
to present a review of all the proposed and already discussed reforms of
the Union. From the point of view of our analysis, for Poland, the most
important institutional reform of the Union may turn out to be the new
division of votes on the Council. Among numerous proposals put forward
concerning the reform, the most disadvantageous for the candidate
countries would be a system addressed to them exclusively, which would
peg the number of votes both to the population of a new member and to its
economic potential, thereby taking into account the great economic
development disparity compared to the current EU member states.
If the current system of voting were maintained, Poland would have
eight votes on the Council of the European Council, similar to Spain. With
that number of votes, it could effectively block or promote particular
policies. Eight votes would make smaller member states, albeit rich and
full of merit in building Europe, apply for Polish support. Those countries
may have well justified fears that their position in the EU would be
undermined. One cannot rule out that during the future institution reform,
the small but rich countries will force through a system in which the
number of votes granted to new members would be in proportion to their
economic potential.
For obvious reasons, such a proposal would be the most
disadvantageous for Poland, and not for small countries such as Slovenia
or Estonia. Thus, completely in spite of its own will, Poland would
become a factor stimulating the institution reform of the Union, and
12
encouraging consensus among the member states concerning proposed
institution reforms.7
A decision to peg the number of votes to the economic potential
of a new member state would mean giving up the rules of democracy.
It would be a decision establishing second class membership. The idea
of second class membership has recently become a fashionable one. Due
to its large appeal to the public, it is most often used to provoke reluctance
towards integration and to encourage people to distance themselves from
the process. However, the use of the term seldom finds sound justification.
Thus, the placement of a country in the second or third integration ring by
no means implies second class membership as long as the character
integration rings remains open. On the other hand, if the number of votes
on the Council were pegged to the economic potential of a member state,
that would make the second class membership come true.
The second scenario
Under the second scenario Poland joins the Union as part of the first
enlargement wave, before the inter-government conference to be held to
reform the system of the Union’s institutions. According to this option, one
of the countries currently holding accession talks is dropped off to the next
enlargement wave. (One should not forget that, under the Amsterdam
Treaty, the admission of five countries does not require a reform of the
Union’s institutions). Poland is granted eight votes on the Council. The
size of the country and its population are an advantage in that sense. Being
a large country, Poland weakens the overly large voting representation of
small and medium member states in the Union. Consequently, according to
the new arrangement, the country is included in the formula of three that
ensures a permanent involvement of a large state during the presidency
rotations. During the future reform of the Union’s institutions, whose goals
would include settling the issue of overly large representation of small and
medium sized countries, Poland’s natural allies would be the five large
member states. With such support, Poland becomes one of the major
member states, and makes an active and effective contribution by
influencing the Union’s future structures.
Poland would be the most powerful among the Central Eastern
European countries in the Union. Thus, together with other countries in the
region, it could also generate the regional economic interests (as it is done,
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for example, by the southern countries with the support of France). All the
Central Eastern European countries would be to a lesser or greater extent
interested in Poland’s support. When summing up the votes, the potential
power of the region would be significant. That voting power would ensure
a realistic possibility to force through particular concepts and solutions.
Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that Poland would not be able to
take full advantage of those eight votes before it would join the core
nucleus of the Union. Together with other countries comprised in the third
ring, it would not participate in the Council votes concerning issues subject
to transition periods, as well as issues related to the monetary union.
As it is known, at the moment Poland does not satisfy the economic
requirements that would enable it to join the Union’s so called core
nucleus. A large part of politicians from Poland’s current government
coalition have spoken in favour of the idea of Europe of nations, and
oppose ties of a federate character. That aspect, being as important as the
economic issues, would prevent Poland from joining the core nucleus of
the Union. This is an objective fact. By joining the third integration ring of
the Union, Poland will not be able to participate in the Union’s initiatives
of a federate character. Countries comprised in the first ring will be able to
undertake such activities. It is a kind of a paradox that among Polish
politicians, mainly those from parties which support a Europe of
nations demand tough negotiations with the EU. On the other hand,
tough negotiations mean struggling to place Poland as close as
possible to the Union’s core nucleus. But seeking to maintain the
greatest independence of the Union’s Eurocrats, one should promote
talks aiming at long transition periods, i.e., very conciliatory
negotiations from the point of view of the Union. Such negotiations
would guarantee the placement of Poland far from the EU federate
nucleus. Polish politicians who support a Europe of nations while
calling for tough negotiations in fact make essentially contradicting
demands that cannot be reconciled.8 By the way, it is difficult to resist
making a comment on transition periods. They should not be demonised.
Some transition periods will be imposed upon Poland for purely political
and social reasons. For example, a transition period concerning
environmental protection standards is of a strictly economic character
because the implementation of the relevant requirements implies
considerable spending that Poland cannot afford right now. However,
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pressures for a transition period concerning a free movement of Polish
labour are of a purely political character. German and Austrian politicians
who have been demanding such a period are perfectly aware that there is
absolutely no threat of a dramatic inflow of Polish labour. Thus, the
formulation of that demand with regard to Poland is a way to increase and
reassure their electorate. Polish negotiators should differentiate between
these two categories of transition periods. They should focus
predominantly on those which are required by economic factors. That by
no means suggests that transition periods into which Poland is forced for
political and social reasons are of a lesser importance. They are of a
similar emotional significance to the public on both sides. In the
understanding of the average Frenchman and the average German, an
automatic threat would arise to their jobs if Poles were granted full right to
work in EU countries. On the other hand, if the average Pole is denied that
right, that would restrict the prerogatives which he would be enjoying as a
holder of the EU passport, making him feel worse compared to the average
Frenchman and German.9 The simplest solution to that problem would be
to hold a large-scale positive information campaign to demonstrate the
absence of threats. However, it is not possible to organise such a campaign
for the time being. Regarding the EU side, no one is interested in such a
campaign. On the contrary, EU politicians claim that they cannot imagine
the opening of the Common labour market to the citizens of new member
states.
The fact that, at the moment, Poland does not qualify to join the
Union’s core nucleus naturally does not mean that the country should not
struggle to be granted eight votes on the Council. The allocation of those
votes to Poland is the most vital issue for the negotiations. Other matters
such as agriculture, fishing, or a free movement of labour, albeit extremely
important, have a secondary importance in the context of that essential
subject. Without being granted a number of votes on the EU Council, that
would be proportional to Poland’s population and territory, the country
would be pushed off to a margin for many years.
The third scenario
According to the third scenario, Poland would not join the Union as
part of the first enlargement wave. Press reports about the country have
not been positive recently. Articles dealing with the future enlargement
present Poland as an overly conceited and at times even arrogant partner
during the accession talks. A number of articles have been published in the
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western press warning Poland against being too self-assured. Below, we
present two most frequently repeated accusations against the country.
According to their authors, these factors may justify the shifting of Poland
to the next enlargement wave, to the waiting line which includes Bulgaria,
Rumania, Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia.
The first accusation: Due to its size, Poland will be faced with the
most difficult negotiations. The talks may take long, and no one will
be waiting for Poland.
Accession talks were started with six countries. One of them has to
be dropped off until the second round unless there is a reform of the
Union’s institutions. At the moment, it is difficult to project when and
whether at all the next enlargement wave will be launched at all. Poland’s
accession to NATO has been certain due to geopolitical factors. The
accession to the Union will be largely determined by economic factors and
the overall balance of costs, and not by a wish to enhance security. Poland
is the largest among the six countries invited to start the accession talks.
The total population of Cyprus, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Estonia combined amounts to 25 million. That corresponds to barely
two-thirds of the Polish population. When comparing the scale of
negotiation issues in the case of Poland and the extent of required
adjustment and reforms of the Polish economy, one may see that only the
combined negotiation issues of the remaining five countries could be used
to make comparisons.
The second accusation: Poland appears to be an unpredictable
partner of the Common Europe because it fails to state its future
contribution to the Community.
None of the Polish governments has made a declaration that could
be treated as the Polish message to the peoples of Europe. Following the
model of the member states which declare the priorities of their
presidency, Poland should put forward a similar list. It is high time to state
what Poland will be seeking to achieve as a member state. These priorities
should be put to a broad debate both in Poland and in the EU. The lack of
any activities in that direction increases Europe’s fear of Poland as an
unpredictable partner. Contrary to other candidate countries, Poland is a
large country. The fear of undermining the position of the current member
states may eliminate Poland from the first enlargement wave. According to
the latest opinion polls, the number of Poland’s supporters in the EU is on
the decline. Furthermore, after the first enlargement wave, Poland should
not count on support from the Czech Republic or Hungary. These
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countries will be competing for the leading position in the region, and
Poland may only threaten their efforts.
One may wonder if the possibility to exclude Poland from the
first enlargement wave is a real one. Naturally one can imagine such a
situation, but the costs inflicted by the country’s absence in the Union
would be very high both for Poland and for the EU. In the long term,
if Poland were kept out of the Union, that would destabilise the entire
continent, thereby also weakening the position of the EU.
Poland outside the Union would return to a buffer zone. By
being left on its own, the country would find itself in a grey European
zone which would be difficult to define. The place vacated due to an
outflow of western capital would be filled in by the capital of eastern
and western criminal organisations. The Odra River which would
constitute the borderline between the East and the West would soon
start to remind Rio Grande as the route for trafficking illegal
immigrants, drugs, arms, and money laundering. Once left on its own,
Poland would become a base for various kinds of criminal
organisations.10 Poland would not have sufficient forces or resources to
fight them. Such fast negative developments would be encouraged by the
permanent destabilisation of the situation in Russia, long years of collapse
of an empire with all its consequences. As a result, the Union would have
to withdraw Poland from the Schengen agreements, tighten EU border
controls and restore visas. Thus, the Union would fall into a self-propelling
syndrome of a stronghold under siege both in the south and in the east.
One can ponder on the above scenario in a greater detail, but let us
leave it to the political fiction writers. It would be better if that projection
disastrous both for Poland and for Europe remained nothing more but
fiction. However, that fiction should be a reminder that sometimes even
the most fantastic scenarios come true in a way unexpected to all.
Conclusions
Fast accession of the six candidate countries to the EU will
stimulate further development of the continent. For Poland, prospects for a
soon membership of the EU are the key to stability. Therefore, ex-premier
Jan Krzysztof Bielecki made a very important point when he appealed to
the Polish government to make an official unilateral commitment, backed
by a parliamentary resolution and in co-operation with the president, to
declare Poland’s readiness for accession to the EU. Thus, Poland would
                                                       
10
 See Menkes J., “Poszerzenie UE a II i III filar integracji - perspektywy, zagro enia, warunki,” in
Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Perspektywy, warunki, szanse i zagro enia, TNOiK, Toru , 1997.
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demonstrate that the entire country is united is united in the pursuit of that
vital goal. After all, if the current deep crisis in Russia, and in the future, in
the entire CIS leads to the emergence of a clear division line, Poland must
find itself on the western side of Europe.11
It is possible to achieve that goal. Poland’s advantage is the support
extended by all its political forces for the integration idea. Another
advantage, which is often underestimated, are the people who prepared the
country for the negotiations. Among them, one may find Jan Kułakowski,
Bronisław Geremek, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Danuta Hübner, or Jacek
Saryusz Wolski. Naturally, it is not possible to mention all of them, and it
is not our goal to take note of all the people involved in Poland’s
integration process on a day-to-day basis. Nonetheless, the people
constitute a great potential which one should bear in mind not to carry on
the impression of total incompetence and inability, which is often spread
by the press. Such opinions have been more frequent following the recent
changes in the leadership of the European Integration Committee.
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